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FROM MUNICH TO MUNICH
Professor Stephen Blank
Strategic Studies Institute

In Munich in 1938, the West abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to the dictators.
On February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin demanded that it do so again. In his
confrontational speech to the annual Wehrkunde conference in Munich, Putin blasted
U.S. policy, blaming American unilateralism for provoking a new arms race,
destabilizing the Middle East, undermining international institutions, distorting the
purpose of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and supporting democratic
revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). He concluded by asserting Russia’s foreign policy independence, clearly demanding that Washington accept
Russia’s demand for equality with it, in practical terms giving Russia a free hand
throughout the former Soviet Union. Reflecting Moscow’s continuing Cold War mentality, Putin also unwittingly revealed the abiding sense of illegitimacy and fear of
fragmentation underlying so much of Russia’s overall policies. Thus he confirmed that
the sources of Russian discord with Washington are military, political, and ideological
(struggles over democratization).
Putin’s threat assessment, like its Soviet predecessors, derives from a false
appreciation of reality on several fronts. First, since 1991 Russia has enjoyed the most
benign threat environment in its history. This benign security environment is in large
measure due to the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe that is both a
precondition and a product of both NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement.
Russian leaders know this because otherwise they would have spent much more on
defense than has been the case. Second, as Alexei Arbatov’s analysis and Putin’s and
Sergei Ivanov’s own past statements indicate, neither U.S. missile defense in Eastern
Europe nor bases in Bulgaria and Romania can threaten Russia or were previously
regarded as threats.
Third, the charges that the United States instigated the color revolutions or uses the
OSCE to overthrow Russia’s government are canards, and Moscow knows it. These
long-standing charges display Russia’s inability to accept criticism of Putin’s regime or
offer the CIS anything other than more corruption and neo-imperialism. These charges
reflect Moscow’s efforts to conceal its inability to defend its clients, its enormous failed
intervention in Ukraine in 2004, and the misrule of the Akayev and Shevarnadze
regimes.
Fourth, NATO enlargement can hardly threaten Russia if one considers NATO’s
enormous post-1989 demilitarization and how NATO currently functions. Russia also
cannot admit that what drove Central Europe and NATO after 1993 was the justified
fear of Russia’s return to autocracy and neo-imperialism. Finally, an alliance that cannot
reach consensus about Afghanistan can hardly threaten Russia. Putin also ignored that

much of American policy towards members of the CIS, the new battleground in this
rivalry, stems from similar apprehensions that Russia sought to undermine CIS
regimes’ sovereignty and independence beginning with its intervention in the wars in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore the expansion
of America’s military posture in Central and Eastern Europe flows directly from the
Global Defense Posture Review of 2004 which was extensively briefed to Moscow and
which was not seen as posing any threat to it. So to see these trends as a threat now is
essentially grandstanding and based on a grievously faulty reading of U.S. policy.
Putin’s diatribe also presages intensified pressure upon CIS governments from
Moscow whether it is directed at their gas and oil economies or at their freedom of
action with regard to their defense and foreign policies. In 2006 alone, Moscow tried to
intimidate the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Central Asia to accept unfair terms either for the purchase of Russian energy or for the
sale of their gas to Russia rather than to Western markets, where they would get a fair
market price. This pressure applies not only to energy but also to these states’ broader
foreign policies, which Moscow aims to reorient to a position of utter subservience to its
dictates. Similar tactics are also visible in Eastern Europe.
Russia has intensified its efforts to project its defense forces into these states,
demonstrating that despite the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), Russia’s leaders still cannot accept that post-Soviet governments are fully
sovereign states. In practice Russia regularly displays its belief that these states have or
should have a diminished sovereignty just as the Brezhnev doctrine postulated for the
former Soviet bloc. Certainly Russian efforts to compel the CIS’ economic and military
submission to its dictates reflects Moscow’s continuing desire to create what Russian
analysts themselves call a solar system, where it is the sun and they revolve
submissively around it.
These pressures are closely tied to Russia’s increasing domestic despotism. Russian
commentators themselves admit that Putin’s regime is a softer version of Communist
rule and cannot survive without exporting itself abroad and corrupting local political
processes as it has done in Russia. Moscow seeks abroad what it aspires to at home, a
regime that answers to no one—including the UN—and does as it pleases, the classical
definition of Russian autocracy. Such a regime is inherently irresponsible, corrupt,
expansive, and inclined to military adventurism. Therefore, Moscow uses the energy
weapon against all the CIS governments, including the Baltic states, either in selling
Russian gas or in exporting Central Asian gas through Russian pipelines. Likewise,
Chechnya and the manufacturing of phantom threats demonstrate the unending costs
of this military adventurism. Putin’s charges and belief that America is pushing Russia
into an arms race or threatening it ultimately represent the outward projection of the
regime’s own inner and unappeasable fears for its own stability and legitimacy.
Henceforth when Putin again invokes Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), he should
remember that the only thing Russia has to fear is fear itself, nameless paralyzing fear
that inhibits all efforts at Russia’s recovery, not American policy.
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